If you were to poll students, I think you would be hard-pressed to find any that have a positive opinion of Securly, our school’s device monitoring system.
There are a number of reasons for this: the first being annoyance.
As Securly trawls our web searches, it slows load times quite dramatically. Exact data is difficult to find or collect, but the routing of all navigations and searches through a Securly server adds an additional layer of slowdown to all navigations. In optimal conditions, this adds very little total time; however, instances of seconds of waiting between each navigation are quite common.
The second problem is more fundamental, related to the very nature of restrictions.
The issue is that restricting websites, such as games, doesn’t actually help reduce the amount of distracted students. What it does is drive students to more and more niche and hidden game sites, sites much more likely to contain viruses or harmful content. Where are you more likely to see an obscene ad or get a virus, coolmathgames.com or unblockedgamesfree.com?
The third problem is how the restricting of sites works.
It’s done by AI. Specifically, Securly employs an AI company known as PageScan, whose language model was originally designed for copywriting. The issue here is twofold: one is the AI making mistakes.
In years prior, blocks were done by hand, but you may notice how blocked sites are now “blocked by category.” This message means that an AI has deemed whatever site you visited disallowed.
The second, larger, problem with an AI based system, is that Securly is sharing student data with this company, meaning that anything done on a school computer, or done on a phone connected to school Wi-Fi, is being used to train AI.
The fourth problem is the aforementioned school Wi-Fi.
Within the context of school computers, many of these misdeeds are excusable by the fact that students consent to it via BVSD’s student device acceptable use policy. This cannot be said for the school Wi-Fi, which activates Securly on any device connected to it; doing so without informing or asking for the consent of the device’s user.
Note that in actuality, precious few students actually consented to the acceptable use policy as people under 18 cannot sign binding contracts.
The final and largest issue is the automatic communication of all student search data to parents.
The problems with this aren’t immediately obvious but can pose a real danger to students. In many situations, a student may be hiding a part of their lives or identity from their parents in order to avoid a perceived threat of abuse. This may seem far-fetched, but it is tragically plausible.
Take, for example, a queer student from a family whom they believe would not accept their identity. It can be devastating for a person to be outed before they are ready, but there is a real risk of disownment, abuse or subjection to conversion “therapy.” In other words, a Securly report telling a student’s parents that they were visiting resources related to queerness could lead to physical and emotional abuse, or worse.
As students are not told of data communication with parents within any resources outside of Securly’s privacy policy—something they are not directed or expected to read—they may not be aware of their lack of privacy until far too late.
Securly causes far more danger than it mitigates.
The consistent invasion of our privacy when we have no other choice is not only appalling and unnerving, but potentially dangerous. An extreme revision of policies related to it or its complete removal is paramount to preserving student privacy and safety.
